Recent Industrial Law in New Zealand by Hodge, Bill
RECENT INDUSTRIAL LAW 
IN NEW ZEALAND 
(a) LEGISLATIVE NOTES 
THE FISHING INDUSTRY (UNION COVERAGE) ACT 1979 
The introduction of this legislation (on 8 June 1979) was noted in the In-
dust rial Rel at ions Chronicle for August at (1979) 4 NZJIR 6 , and briefly 
discussed there . It was signed into law on 30 November 1979 and , as of 
March 1 980 , the Minister of Labour had not consented to the registration of 
any union in the fishing industry . The Act would be more accurately known as 
the Fishing Industry Union Exclusion Act . 
" Fishing industry" is defined in the Act to include operating the boat, cat-
ching the fish (including shellfish and crustaceans), processing the catch on 
board, transferring any fish from one vessel to another (whether processed or 
not) and unloading the catch , any processed fish and any by-products . No ex-
isting union can extend its coverage to such work or such workers; member-
ship rules which do so extend are deemed to be amended, and awards and 
agreements are to be read as similarly amended. The Waterfront Industry Act 
1976 and orders made thereunder are also excluded from the fishing industry . 
Only one union at one time can be registered in the industry, and the consent of 
the Minister is required before a society can apply to register as an industrial 
union of workers . 
Industrial relations legislation has not, by historical practice in New Zealand , 
covered fishermen; waterside unions have, traditionally , tolerated the local 
fishermen unloading their own catch , although , technically, it may have been 
watersiders' work . 
The peaceful status quo was upset by the arrival of large overseas vessels , 
joint-venturing under the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 
1977 . See, for example, the Wesermunde dispute discussed at (1979) 4 NZ-
JIR 7 (May). It may be that the innovation of foreign crews discharging cargo 
from large (200 ft and over in length) fishing boats will disturb the waterfront . 
On the other hand, there are good reasons why routine union coverage should 
not extend to the fishing industry . First, fishing boats have traditionally 
operated on a profit-sharing structure as opposed to the standard wage packet. 
Secondly, there are frequently occasions in the industry when speed and long 
hours are absolutely essential for a successful voyage. To the extent that 
similar conditions apply in larger ships, union exclusion may well be ap-
propriate. See Mazengarb, "Union Coverage Legislation Trawls Up Unrest", 
National Business Review, 17 March 1980, p 23 . 
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REMUNERATION ACT 1979 
The Remuneration Bill was introduced on 27 July 1979, and passed through 
1ts three readings quickly and signed by the Governor General on 1 0 August 
1979: See Industrial Relations Chronicle (1979) 4 NZJIR 2 (November) . The 
first regulations made thereunder were the Remuneration (General Increase) 
Regulations SR 1979/ 170, which provided for a general wage increase of 
4.5% from 3 September. These regulations, gazetted only three days after the 
Act became law, were proxy for the "minimum living wage " application made 
by the FOL under the General Wage Orders Act 1977, an application rendered 
nugatory by the repeal of the General Wage Orders Act (section 9, Remunera-
tion Act). 
The Remuneration Act is further evidence of the failure of successive govern-
ments and a series of independent agencies to control inflation . The Econom1 c 
Stabilization Regulations SR 1 9 53 / 50 (in force until 1 969). the General Wage 
Orders Act 1969, the Stabilization of Remuneration Act 1 971, the Remunera-
tion Authonty , the Stabilization Remuneration Regulations SR 1972/ 59 , the 
Economic Stabilization Regulations SR 1973/ 198, the Wages Tribunal , the 
Wage Adjustment Regulations (w1th sixteen amendments), the Wage Hear1ng 
Tribunal, ·the Industrial Commission , the rebirth of the Arbitration Court , and 
the General Wage Orders Act 1 977 are a partial list of the seriatim failures of 
National and Labour Governments - and five Prime Ministers - over a ten -
year period . 
The Remuneration Act provides for ad hoc wage controls by the Cabinet , 
although there is clear and specific authority for that power to be subdelegated 
to any "authority, tribunal, person or class of persons" . The Act extends to the 
Public Service and Crown employment generally, excepting only judges, om-
budsmen and the Controller and Auditor General (see below for judicial 
salaries). A new definition of "remuneration" extends to "expenses, refunds 
and allowances to meet expenditure already incurred" , thus reversing Regula-
tion 2 of the Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974 (reprinted at SR 1978/226) . 
The act allows for the regulation of conditions of employment separately from 
levels of remuneration and, in general, reveals a draftsman's determination to 
close all loopholes. For a detailed examination of that statutory mtent see the 
careful review by Professor Szakats on "Downgrading the Arbitration Court ; 
Wage Fixing by Regulations" (1979) NZLJ 390 . 
For examples of the Act in operation see the Remuneration Regulations , 
noted above, at SR 1979/ 170, the remunerat ion (New Zealand Engine Drivers , 
Boiler Attendants, Firemen and Greasers Award) Regulations , SR 1980/24, 
and the Remuneration (New Zealand Forest Products) Regulations , SR 
1980/29. The Engine Drivers et al were prohibited from seeking new heads or 
items of remuneration (such as registration allowances), while the N.Z . Forest 
Products Regulations restricted rates of pay increase for twenty-two separate-
named collective agreements to 1 8.06% until 4 March 1 981. These regula -
tions which applied to the combined union negotiations at the NZFP plant at 
Kinleith (and adjunct operations) have since been revoked : SR 1 980/45 . Both 
of the latter regulations established a $1 ,000 fine for attempted evasion of the 
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regulations, the maximum fine allowed under s 4 (f) of the Remuneration Act 
1979. 
For a general comment on the Remuneration Act and the subsisting 
Economic Stabilisation Act 1948, see "Who Will Arbitrate Now?" (editorial) 
( 1 9 79) NZLJ 31 3 . The learned editor refers to the latter Act as an "avian corp-
se hanging about the neck of open government'', and regulations thereunder as 
' the ideal instrument of a despot". 
(b) CASE NOTES: 
DISPUTES PROCEDURE: PARTY IN DEFAULT MAY REFER DISPUTE TO 
COURT 
Arbitration Court, Wellington . 2 5 January 1 980 (AC 2 / 80) 
Horn C J , McDonnell , Oldham. 
This application onginated as a substantive dispute between the Union and 
the employer emanating from the new service (Flight TE6) on the Auckland-
Honolulu -Los Angeles-Honolulu-Auckland route. The Union claimed that the 
work was not "normal work" and that the distance travelled, the time in the 
air, the changing time zones and the inadequate rest during the Thursday-
Tuesday return flight caused undue fatigue and a direct threat to the health and 
safety of the crew and, indirectly, a threat to the safety of the passengers. In-
dustrial action was taken and the particular flight was temporarily discon-
tinued . 
That substantive dispute - which has since been resolved by an order of the 
Director of Civil Aviation - was not before the Arbitration Court in this case. 
The only matter before the Court was a technical procedural dispute concern-
ing the operation of the disputes mechanism set out in sections 1 1 5 and 1 1 6 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 and recorded in clause 24 of the Air New 
Zealand Stewards and Hostesses Award, 79 BA 4131. In particular, the 
dispute relates to s 11 5(4) which provides that "where any party of a dispute 
of rights fails to observe the procedure ... set out in s 1 1 6 . . any party to the 
dispute may refer it to the Arbitration Court for settlement." 
In this case the company purported to invoke the procedure and convene a 
disputes committee under the chairmanship of a former industnal relations of-
ficer with A1r New Zealand, Mr John Button, now a conciliator. This chairman-
ship was "arranged" by the company rather than having been mutually agreed 
upon by the parties per subclause (3) of the disputes provision . The arrange-
ment was not the procedure set out in the Act and the union protested the ap-
plication to the Court on the grounds that the defaulting party was taking ad-
vantage of its own default in circumventing the disputes procedure. The Court 
found that s 11 5(4) allowed "any party to the dispute" (including the 
defaulting party) to refer a case to the Arbitration Court where "any party" 
fails to observe the disputes procedure. 
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The Court also noted that deliberate abuse of the disputes procedure could 
lead the Court to decline jurisdiction under s 48(4) of the Act. The Court noted 
further that disputes of right should be settled as quickly as possible and a 
" rough and ready" approach to procedure may not be inappropriate . Finally , 
the Court found the Union itself to have violated the disputes clause, since 
subclause (7), which provides for continuation of normal work, was not being 
observed by the Union. (The Union, of course, submitted that the new flight 
plan was not "normal work".) 
Comment 
Air transport in New Zealand must be considered a troubled industry . Air New 
Zealand, in particular , is attempting to rally from the effects of the DC 10 
d1saster in Antarctica, escalating fuel costs, and the shotgun marriage of Air 
New Zealand and N.A .C., retrospectively made legal , post-consummation , by 
the ex post facto New Zealand National Airways Corporation Dissolution Act 
1978 (the merger took place on 1 April 1 978 - the authorising statute 
became law on 11 October 1978. See Vennell, "Unanswered Questions in the 
Air New Zealand - NAC Merger" ( 1 979) NZLJ 228 ; see also ( 1 979) NZLJ 
406 and (1980) NZLJ 13) . 
Safety must be of the greatest concern to the Union, having lost fifteen of its 
members in the Mt Erebus aircrash , the greatest disaster in a workplace in New 
Zealand since the explosion at the Strongman mine in 1 96 7 . Flying as cabin 
crew for Air New Zealand has displaced farming as the most dangerous profes-
sion in New Zealand , and the Union would be in dereliction of duty were 1t not 
to question and resist unsafe practices by the company. (See statistics, New 
Zealand Official Yearbook 1977, pp 818 and 821 ; NZOY 1976, pp 893 and 
897 . Farmers die an accidental death at a rate of nearly 1 per thousand, by far 
the highest occupational rate . Air New Zealand cabin crews, in the statistical 
year ending 31 March 1980, suffered accidental death at a rate of nearly 22 
per thousand (15 out of 770 .) 
Sequelae 
A special general meeting of the Union was held on 1 9 January 1 980, and 
by a 95% majority the Union resolved not to operated TE 006 "as currently 
planned because it is unduly fatiguing and compromises the health and safety 
of crew members and the safety of the travelling public in the event of an in-
flight emergency on the HNL - AKL (sic) all -night flight" (the last leg of the 
return trip). Twelve members of the Union did operate Flight TE 006 on 31 
January 1 9 80, that is, the first Thursday after the Arbitration Court decision on 
2 5 January. Those members were then informed that disciplinary proceedings 
were to be brought against them, under the Union Rulebook, for " irresponsible 
conduct", "bringing the Union into disrepute ", and /or prejudicing the condi -
tions of employment of the members of the Union". 
On 14 February 1980 those twelve Union members sought and obtained an 
injunction against the Union to restrain the Union and its agents directly or in-
directly from proceeding to hear and determine disciplinary charges against 
them , and from interfering with the applicants' Union membership or contract 
43 
of employment: Marinovic and others v Airline Stewards and Hostesses of N.Z. 
I.U.W., Supreme Court, Auckland; 14 February 1980 (A 123/80) Mahon J. 
In the meantime, the Director of Civil Aviation rendered the substantive 
dispute moot by ordering "in the interest of safety" that fresh crew be taken 
on at Honolulu for the last leg of the return flight and the cabin staff of the 
previous legs be flown home as passengers. 
The Director of Civil Aviation is empowered to ensure the safety of aircraft, 
under the Civil Aviation Act 1 964, s 29(4) as amended by the Civil Aviation 
Amendment Acts of 1970 (s 2(1 )) and 1975 (s 7(2)) and the Civil Aviation 
regulations 1953 reprinted as SR 1974/27 5, as amended by SR 1979/ 18, 
Regulation 8A(4) 
APPRENTICES ACT 1948: PENAL TV FOR DISCHARGE 
District Commissioner of Apprenticeship v G. J. Francis Ltd. 
Arbitration Court, Auckland. 21 December 1979 (A.C. 123/79). 
Horn CJ, Jacobs and Oldham. 
Th e Apprentices Act 1 948 provides a mechanism ins 38 for the discharge of 
an unsatisfactory apprentice The defendant employer used that mechanism, 
was refused leave to discharge the apprentice, but discharged him never-
theless. In an act1on for breach of the Act, the Court found that the maximum 
penalty, under s 38(8) and 42(6)of the Act, was a $100 fine. A further penalty 
of$ 20 per day for a "continumg breach" was not relevant, as a discharge IS a 
historical event which happens only once and wh1ch does not persist. Although 
there is a reference to "re lief from the discharge" m s 38 ( 1 2), there is no ap-
parent prOVISIOn for rem statement in the Apprentices Act 1 948 . Violation of an 
order to continue to employ an apprentice, however, may incur a daily penalty 
for a continuing breach. 
See also Inspector of Awards (Andrews) v Darryll Chowan Motors Ltd. Ar-
bitratiOn Court, Auckland, 24 May 1979 (AC 47/79), where section 26(3) of 
the Apprentices Act, which allowed a probationary apprentice to be dismissed 
"at any time by the employer", was interpreted by Williamson J to mean upon 
givmg appropriate notice or paymg the appropriate wages in lieu of notice. 
It should also be noted that the court held that the Apprentices Act tends to 
"protect apprentices and give them conditions more favourable than those en 
JOyed by most other workers." Apprenticeship contmues to be a significant 
portal of entry mto the workforce Including those in Government Depart-
ments, there were 31,538 apprenticeship contracts in force at the end of the 
last statistical year: 1979 N.Z . Official Yearbook p. 764. 
REINSTATEMENT: A POSITION NOT LESS ADVANTAGEOUS 
Auckland Clerical and Office Staff Employees I.U.W. v Vacation Hotels Ltd. 
Arbitration Court, Auckland. 20 November 1 9 7 9 ( 1 09/79). Horn CJ, Jacobs 
and Oldham. 
In a prev1ous dec1sion of the Court, Williamson J found that P, a n1ght 
telephonist at the Intercontinental Hotel, had been unJUStifiably dismissed, and 
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ordered reinstatement: AC23/79 , 16 March 1979, see (1979) 4 NZJIR 41. 
Will1amson J had ordered that P "be remstated 1n his former pos1t1on or in a 
position not less advantageous to him" (emphasiS added). 
As P had been found asleep at his post at the switchboard room in a large 
hotel, 1n sole charge of communications, in a Situation where senous harm 
could have resulted , the employer resolved to 'reinstate" Pas a waiter. P was 
offered terms and conditions of employment, defined ob1ect1vely, under the 
L1censed Hotel Workers Award at least as favourable as those under his 
prev1ous (Clerical Workers) Award. 
P and h1s Union submitted that a telephonist was more skilled than a waiter, 
which P regarded as "a lower occupation" The Un1on cla1med, therefore, that 
the employer was 1n breach of the court order and in breach of the award, in 
terms of s 1 24A (6) (c) of the lndustnal Relat1ons Act 1973, as amended. 
The Court looked at the matter "broadly" and found no disadvantages toP. 
H1s wages, hours, and other terms of employment as a wa1ter, measured ob1ec 
t1vely , were at least as favourable as those of a telephonist. 
The decis1on establishes that, as a matter of law, in cases of reinstatement, 
objective criteria and not subjective attitudes will determine whether a new 
pos1tion is less advantageous. The Court may also have 1mpl1ed that the 
worker's second application could be charactensed by the Yiddish word chutz-
pa (perhaps best rendered into colloqu1al New Zealand speech as "cheek") in 
that P was lucky to have been reinstated in the f1rst case. 
UNJUSTIFIABLE DISMISSAL: ALLEGATION OF THEFT UNPROVEN 
Wellington etc Clerical Workers IUW v JN Anderson and Son Ltd. 
Arbitration Court, Napier. 28 November 1979 (AC115/79). 
Horn CJ, Jacobs and Walton. 
Ms H was observed by a fellow-worker probing a third worker's purse in the 
lad1es ' restroom , an area subject to petty theft. This mformat1on was passed on 
to management and, in rapid sequence, the police were mformed, Ms H was 
dismissed , she was taken to the police stat1on and her home was searched. Ap-
parently the initial search of her personal effects and her home was without 
warrant and prior to arrest. Those searches were either w1th the consent of Ms 
H or illegal. In due course charges of theft were dism1ssed and the Clerical 
Workers Union brought an action for unjustifiable dismissal per the remedy set 
out ins 117 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, contained in the N.Z. Clerical 
Workers Award at 77 BA 8687. The union sought$ 3,000 compensation and 
$ 1 .436-4 7 lost wages, apparently seeking to have the emp loyer compensate 
Ms H for alleged "undue harassment by the pol1ce". The union d1d not seek 
reinstatement. 
The approach of the company was to turn the matter over to the pol1ce, and 
dismiss Ms H when informed that there was enough evidence for a prosecutor. 
The company made no inquiries of its own. 
The court found that the company had not justified the dismissal. Ms H was 
not given a chance to put forward an explanation; she was summarily dismiss-
ed instead of being suspended, and, most importantly, the worker who had 
witnessed the alleged theft was not called to testify at the Arbitration Court. 
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Loss of wages and compensation were fixed at $ 1 , 000 and $7 50 respect1ve 
ly. 
The case might well be compared with Wellington Amalgamated Shop 
Assistants I.U.W. v Wardell Bros Ltd (1977) Ind. Ct 13, where the court stron 
ly recommended suspensiOn 1n cases where workers were suspected of on-the 
job dishonesty. By implication the court also suggested that employers in such 
situations conduct their own inquiry, perhaps allowing the employee in ques 
tion an opportunity to explain. 
Mr Walton dissented , quite stoutly, from the judgment, arguing that the 
employer was placed in an invidious position, choosing not to inflict a 
" Kangaroo court" or double jeopardy on its worker . In addition, any testimony 
(such as a confess1on) elecited during such an internal inquiry might well have 
been Inadmissible at a subsequent trial because it was obtained involuntanly 
BILL HODGE 
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THE JUDICIAL SALARIES ORDER (NO 2) 1979 
Current jud1cial salaries (as from 8 October 1979) include the 4 .5 % general 
wage increase of 3 September, and are set out below. 
Chief Just1ce 
Pres1dent of the Court of Appeal 
Chief Judge of the Arbitration Court 
Judge of the Supreme Court (now High Court) 
Judge of the Arbitration Court 
Judge of the Compensation Court 
Ch1ef Judge of the Maori Land Court 
Judge of the Maori Land Court 
Magistrate (now District Court Judge) 
$53,490 
51 ' 183 
49,452 
49,452 
44 ,2 61 
38,493 
37,339 
33,878 
37,339 
See SR 1979/ 208 . Presumably provision will be made for an increased salary 
for the Ch1ef Judge of the District Court. 
For prev1ous salary levels, see SR 1 9 7 9/7, SR 1 9 7 8 / 2 6 5, SR 1 9 7 8 / 1 09, SR 
1978/ 103, SR 1977/ 170, SR 1976/322 , SR 1976/2 16, SR 1976/ 55 , SR 
1975/ 275, SR 1975/ 176, SR 1975/76, and SR 1974/ 189. 
With eleven salary increases in less than five years , JUdicial salaries have 
more than doubled. From the beginning of 1 9 7 5 to the end of 1 9 7 9 , 
Magistrates have enjoyed an increase from $17,608 to $37,339, while the 
Chief Justice has gone from $26,449 to $53,490. 
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